Robert C. Ringer,591st Field Artillery Battalion, Service Battery
Personal Report
As
Ammunition Officer for the 591st Field Artillery Battalion, 105 mm Howitzer,
the Direct Support Battalion of the 424 Infantry Regiment, I was an observer
of what went on over a wide area.
Most
authors if they say anything, state that the 424th Regiment made a disorganized
withdrawal to the west. On the contrary, both withdrawals were expertly
conducted by Col. A. Reid and his people. The proof is that the units in
eluding the artillery lived to fight another day. The Infantry and Artillery
Supply units cooperated in every way. On 12 Dec 1944, all officers and
men of Service Battery at the request of the 424th Infantry took off our
goulashes and sent them to line companies lacking foot protection.On 17 Dec we sent all our machine gun ground mounts except the gun guarding
the bridge at Berg Reuland. We also brought small arms ammunition forward.
The
Infantry and Cpt.. James Wells Engineers returned the favor by clearing
a trail to get our guns out of Heckhalenfeld.
We
fired 50,000 artillery rounds from 10 December until 15 March 1945. For
a single day the most fired was on Dec 16 2,598 rounds and on 25 Dec (Manhay)
2,370 rounds. This was done with the worn out howitzers from the 2nd Division.
Traversing gears were worn and frequently rounds had to be rammed in and
the cases out because the tubes were in poor condition. One of the great
mysteries came when Corps Artillery pulled all three of their medium
and heavy artillery battalions out at noon on 17 Dec to leave only our
battalion and a few tanks to do the support job.
In
addition to the Infantry, I would like to praise LTC Philip Hoover
and CPT. M. M. Dolitsky of our Battery for their leadership and
bravery. Also from my Ammunition Train S/SGT John Schlesser, Sgt.'s
Charles Datte and James Brackett and Cpl John Howard who were towers
of strength in the battle. Datte and Howard were with me
at the 51st Annual Reunion in Nashville, September 1997.Signed
Robert
C. Ringer 591/SV
After Battle Report with "interlaced" personal reports by individual soldiers.
HEADQUARTERS
424th Infantry
APO 443 U.S.
Army
AFTER BATTLE
REPORT
ending
31 December 1944
To: Commanding General, 106 Inf. Division, APO 443, U.S. Army
At
the close of November, a warning order was given for movement to the continent,
and the regiments left the billeted areas December 2nd for Southampton.Vehicles embarked on LSTs and the remainder of the regiment boarded the
New Zealand steamship the SS Monowai for the channel crossing. The
crossing was made uneventfully, but bad weather set in before the men could
debark and the regiment sat in the channel off Le Havre for four days waiting
for clear weather.
Finally
on 6 December, the sea calmed enough to permit debarkation, and the regiment
landed at Le Havre.From that port, trucks took the regiment to the
vicinity of Yerville, in the Normandy Peninsula. After two nights and a
day in the mud, rain and cold, the regiment againen-trucked 8 December,
1944 and began a cross-country dash to Belgium.
The
move to the front line area took two days and a night of constant travel.The route cut across northern France and straight across Belgium to the
eastern border.
The
Division had received orders to replace the 2nd Division in the front lines,
in the St. Vith area facing the Siegfriedline so the 424th went
into bivouac a few miles west of St. Vith while awaiting final replacement
plans to be drawn up by the 424th and the 23rd, which it was relieving.
The regiment closed-in 10 December and stayed there until 12 December in
a blanketing snow storm interspersed with sleet and rain.
12
December 44
The
424th Infantry moved into the front lines for the first time in its history
when it relieved the 23rd Infantry of the 2nd Division on 7,000 yards frontage
in the St. Vith sector of the Belgium-German border. With positions on
the western edge of the Siegfried line the 3d Battalion took over prepared
emplacements on the left, or north flank and the 2d Battalion moved into
the right half of the front lines, adjacent to the 28th Infantry Division.The 1st battalion was kept in reserve at Steinebruck.In the 3d Battalions,
K Company, was on the left and L Company on the right, with I Company in
reserve.The 2d Battalion placed F Company on the left, G on the
right, and E in reserve.Cannon Company cemented a gap between the
2d Battalion and the 106 Recon troop.The 423rd was on the left.
In
the overall tactical picture the commanding General had put the 422nd Infantry
to the left on the Division front, the 423rd in the troublesome center
sector, and the 424th on the south or right flank.The Regimental
CP.. was at Heckhalenfeld and the Division CP.. at St. Vith.
The
regiment made the replacement move without incident, turning its personnel
carrying trucks over to the 23rd.The operation was completed by
1530.No artillery, air, or ground interference was encountered.
First
physical contact with the enemy was established at 1830 the same day when
the 3d Battalion reported an enemy patrol in front of its lines and requested
artillery fire on the patrol.At the same time A Company received
the regiment’s actual baptism of fire when 10 rounds of mortar landed in
this forward area, wounding two men, the first casualties from intimate
action in the regiment.The two men were private Harold E. Shagrin
and Pvt. Fosse. Both received Purple Hearts, the first in the regiment.
More mortar fire landed in the G Company area at 2050.
At
approximately the same time, the first of a series of fires started in
the regimental area.Company C, 81st Engineers, reported one of its
small personnel hutment's burning.It was brought under control with
only the loss of personal equipment and radio.
Service
Company, however, had more trouble in its area.Stationed at ALCHERATH,
a fire broke out in a three story structure in which were quartered members
of the 2d Battalion motor pool.One man, Pvt. Theron McCollum, H
Company, was burned to death in the fire.At the height of the fire,
Capt. Uhel Barrickman, MTO, reported a shot was fired at him in the dark.Movements were seen in the brush near the burning house and the two instances
of light signals from an adjoining civilian house were noticed. The CIC
was called on the case.
The
rest of the night was quiet, was a minimum of patrol activity by both sides.
The
next day saw another fire destroy Regimental Headquarters. All records
and personal effects, however, were removed.All fires were found
have been started from carelessness, not sabotage.
John Connors, 424/HQ
2BNDec 12
Personal Report
I was the Motor Transportation
Officer in the 2nd Battalion of the 424th. After arriving in St. Vith in
early December ‘44, with all of the Battalion vehicles .Our CO ordered
me to go back to Quartermaster to get trucks to move all of our personnel
to the front. When I returned in a day or so we loaded all the men in the
trucks and transported them to the front line positions being held by elements
of the 2nd Division in the Grosskampenberg area. This was about 3 or 4
days before the 16th, I believe. I then took my men and the Battalion vehicles
back to an old deserted farm house to use as a Motor Pool and billet. After
deploying the vehicles and setting up a 24 hour guard roster all of us
, except the guard on duty, crawled in to our sleeping bags to get some
rest. Around 2 am I awakened to hear men screaming loudly and my first
thought was that we were being attacked. I went in to the area where most
of the yelling was coming from and it was engulfed in flames. My Sgt. John
Kopko, now deceased) and I routed the men who we could find who were still
in their sleeping bags and got them out. We managed to find our way back
to the Service Company area and when we checked we had everyone accounted
for except one man. As soon as daylight came we went back to the sight
which was a pile of smoldering ashes. Upon reaching the area and then going
through the ashes we found his remains in a still zipped up sleeping bag.
This was quite a shock to all of us and we later found out that the fire
was started when one of the guards attempted to heat some coffee with a
burner and it started a fire in the dry hay that covered the floor
. The next day I was notified that the Regimental CO, Col. Reid, ordered
me to report to him to explain what happened. My Jeep driver and I started
for the Regimental Command Post and as we pulled into a path leading up
to the building, another old farm house, I had my head down’ expecting
the worst, when the driver said look! When I looked up the whole Command
Post building was engulfed in flames. I learned from the Adjutant that
the fire was started by careless use of matches and a candle by one of
the CP personnel .The Adjutant then informed me that the Col. no longer
wanted to talk to me about my fire. A day or so later the Bulge started
and with things in total confusion we had no idea. where our Battalion
was. Finally I found out from someone coming back that they had been pulled
back to Burg Reuland and with the help of maps, road signs and prayers
we found our way back to them and so began our saga of the rest of the
Bulge # # # - Connors
John P. Dimeglio, 424/I
Dec 12
At LeHavre, France we were
issued some new equipment and some ammunition. We lined up to be issued
galoshes. There were only two sizes left size 8 and size 10 (I wear a size
11 shoe). We had to sign and accept the small size that we couldn’t get
on. We discarded the small boots into a large pile. The lack of rubber
boots was to cost us much pain in the Bulge. We were trucked up to the
front on Dec. 12th to relieve the 2nd Division. They led us to dugouts
that held about eight men. # # # - Dimeglio
13 December 44 - The Blue, or 3d Battalion continued to catch the brunt of the enemy action.During the night, enemy vehicles of an undetermined number and type were reported moving across the front of the 3d Battalion to the 2d Battalion area.They apparently were reconnaissance vehicles, howeverthey did no firing and moved away without incident.Bulk of the fire hitting in the K Company locality continued to be 80mm mortar fire, with one round shattering a machine gun and wounding one man.
General Perrin made his first visit to the 424th front lines when he, along with Colonel Reid, toured the 3rd Battalion positions, interviewing Capt. Richard Comer, K Company Commander.The General also visited the Regimental CP.
14 - 15 December 1944- Little activity was reported in any Battalion sector in the period 14 and 15 December. Only slight patrol movement was reported on any front in the two day lull before the storm. The 3rd Battalion reported small enemy patrols in front of its sector and the night of the 14th heard a concentration of vehicles to its front. All enemy movements seemed to be centered in that area. A 3rd Battalion patrol, the night of the 15th failed to make contact with the enemy.
Hubert Hochstetter (dscd)
424/I Dec 15
Regimental Headquarters
was at Winterspelt. Battalion Headquarters at Heckhalenfeld, with K and
L companies on line in the area of Heckhuscheid, K Company on the right
and L Company on the left, with a light machine gun section of I Company
to the left of L Company. There was a gap of about 600 to 1200 yards to
the left of the battalion positions between 3rd Battalion end Cannon Company
which was online as a rifle company to the west of Eigelscheid. An outpost
manned by I Company was established between 3rd Battalion and Cannon Company.
The remainder of I Company was in reserve.
3rd Battalion took over
its area from the 2nd Division on December 14, 1944. On the 14th and 15th
of December 1944 I led patrols to the area in front of our positions. The
first was in front of K Company and we covered the area to the front of
K Company up to close observation of the dragons teeth and the West Wall.
I also lead a patrol through Eigelscheid and east about 1500 yards. We
saw very little evidence of German activity and no abnormal activity at
the West Wall. We made no firing contacts on these patrols. # # # - Hochstetter
Robert Shaw (dscd) 424/H
Dec 14
I haven’t seen much mention
of what the second battalion of the 424th was doing. I believe we were
one of few units, if not the only one to hold their position until about
midnight on the seventeenth. I will tell you what happened and you use
your own judgment as to what if any you wish to use.
Our survival started on
Dec 14. In mid morning I was notified I would have to turn in one half
of my 81mm mortar ammunition. My CO claimed I had no use for so much and
it was needed in the Aachen area. I objected immediately and was told to
do it with no more arguing. About three o’clock that afternoon, the S4
came up with a truck. the CO counted my supply and had my men load one
half of it, gave me a lecture on obeying orders, and all left. As they
were leaving, I remarked to Mark Wagner, my driver, that if someone could
find some ammunition to replace what had been taken, we would be much safer,
and I would sleep better.
About seven o’clock that
night, Mark came into my C P and said he had found what I needed. I went
out and he and Chuck Garn, whom I know you have met, had a trailer loaded
with the stuff. We stacked it covered it with branches and snow, and felt
real good about the deal. ### Shaw
Robert M. Shaw (dscd)
Dec 15
On the fifteenth, about
four o’clock the Bn Commander called and asked if I had placed all my sections
where they were supposed to be. Of course I hadn’t for two of the positions
were strictly suicide spots and the guns and crew wouldn’t last no time
at all if there was a fire fight. The third section was set so close to
the top of the hill, every time they fired the muzzle blast would be seen
by the Germans across the valley. I was given one hour to move both sections
or be relieved. The third section under Lt. Duane McKay, left immediately.
The second section I sent up into the woods to get out of sight, with orders
to return as soon as it got dark. Their position was in back of the line
about one hundred yards. They would catch every shell overshooting the
main line. ###- Shaw